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in the instant case will go far towards discouraging any
realistic hope that decedents may avoid the tax conse-
quences of their reserved life estates by death-bed sales.3 7
THOMAS J. S. WAXTER, JR.
Creation Of A Trust On Insurance Proceeds By The
Use Of Precatory Expressions In A
Testamentary Instrument
Waesche v. Rizzuto'
The appellants, trustees named under the last will and
testament of the decedent, were sued by the appellee,
sister of the testator's wife and member of the testator's
household, to have the court construe and enforce a testa-
mentary trust allegedly created by the will. The residuary
clause provided for the establishment of a trust fund and
further provided that it was the testator's "will and desire"
that his trustees make arrangements to assure the adequate
support of the appellee, among others, from the trust fund
so created. The testator then declared:
"[R]ealizing it is beyond my power by this will and
testament to do so, but relying upon faith and confi-
dence in my trustees [who were named in the insur-
ance policy as beneficiaries] that they will comply
with my desires, it is my wish that, upon my death,
87 Note that after the Tenth Circuit held that the $900,000 corpus was
within the gross estate, the $140,000 consideration paid for the life interest
was deducted therefrom. This result is based upon a construction of IRC
of 1939, Section 811 (i), (now IRC of 1954, § 2043), which provides for
the event that insufficient consideration is received and states that, "- * *
there shall be included in the gross estate only the excess of the fair
market value at the time of death of the property otherwise to be in-
cluded on account of such transaction, over the value of the consideration
received therefore by the decedent." The wording of this section is unclear
as applied to transfers of reserved life estates, but it is submitted that this
section does not warrant a reduction of the $900,000 figure once it is
determined it is includible in the gross estate. The section appears to
apply where the decedent h'as received less than he transferred away,
with the term property 'otherwise to be included" intending to refer to
property transferred away. Here there was no transfer of the $900,000
corpus, and the consideration was for the life interest only. It appears
that in this situation Section 811 (i) contemplates that the $900,000 is
includible and that as much of the $140,000 as decedent has not spent by
the time of her death is also includible, as an addition to rather than a
deduction from the includible corpus.
'224 Md. 573, 168 A. 2d 871 (1961).
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the monthly payments of insurance to my trustees be
included in the trust fund . -.2
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in affirming the de-
cision of the lower court, held that a trust had been created
notwithstanding the utilization of the precatory words,
"my will and desire." The Court relied upon two prior
Maryland decisions wherein precatory terms were inter-
preted.' Further, and of greater significance, the Court
found that the testator intended the insurance money to
form a portion of the trust fund and, as such, the intent
was enforceable. It was reasoned that since the precatory
words employed by the testator in the earlier provision
of the will establishing the trust were found to be manda-
tory and not directory, the same construction should be
applied to similar expressions in the later provision creat-
ing a portion of the trust res.4
A primary requisite for the creation of an express trust
is a manifestation of intent by the settlor that a com-
pellable trust be created.' The cases in which the courts
encounter the greatest difficulty in ascertaining whether
the testator intended the bequest or devise to pass free of
legal restrictions or whether it was to be restricted to a
designated purpose are those in which a trust was allegedly
created through the employment of precatory expressions6
Precatory words are usually words of wishing, desiring
or hoping as distinguished from words of direction or com-
mand, which more clearly show an intent to impose a legal
duty upon a transferee.7
Under the early view the courts readily found that the
property bequeathed was impressed with a trust notwith-
standing the fact that only precatory language was em-
2Id., 582-3.
' Gerke v. Oolonial Trust Co., 114 Md. 289, 79 A. 587 (1911) ; Handley v.
Wrightson, 60 Md. 198 (1883).
'The Court quoted Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 45, 36 A. 2d 551 (1944)
"[Wihen a certain term appears in a will more than once, the Court
will infer that the testator intended the term to have the same mean-
ing wherever used, unless a contrary intention clearly appears from
the context."
'Mortgage Corp. v. Debenture Corp., 178 Md. 658, 676, 16 A. 2d 866
(1940) ; Seabrook v. Grimes, 107 Md. 410, 417, 68 A. 883 (1908) ; in general
see 1 ,BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1951) § 45; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS (2d ed.
1956) § 23; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 2d (1959) §§ 23, 25; 54 Am. Jur. 44,
Trusts, § 33; 89 C.J.S. 770, Trusts, § 42.
''BOGERT, op. cit. supra, n. 5, § 48, p. 341.
In general see 2 ALEXANDER, COMMENTARIES ON WILLS (1918) § 1088
et seq.; 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1951) § 48; 1 SCOTT. TRUSTS (2d
ed. 1956) § 25: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 2d (1959) § 25; RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935). Md. Anno. (1940) § 25; 54 Am. Jur. 64, Trusts, § 54 et 8eq.;
89 C.J.S. 784, Trusts, § 44.
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ployed by the testator. Accordingly, under this view, prec-
atory words prima facie imposed a trust on the bequest
or devise involved unless a contrary intention appeared
in the context of the instrument.' One reason, and per-
haps the most logical explanation, for the adoption of this
rule by the early English courts is that at one time in
England, no words, no matter how mandatory in nature,
could create more than a moral obligation upon a trustee
to carry out the purpose of the trust.9 It was, therefore,
natural that the testator use words of request. It was also
natural that this tendency to use precatory words should
continue when trusts subsequently became legally as well
as morally binding upon trustees and that the courts, in
order to enforce the trusts, should adopt the above rule of
construction. 10 However, even under this early rule, if the
particular purpose of the trust was too indefinite," or
the testator expressed a desire to impose a trust not only
upon the property bequeathed to the alleged trustee, but
also on property owned absolutely by the "trustee" in his
own right, 2 the property received by the legatee or devisee
did not pass subject to the alleged trust.13
While the earlier courts thus accepted the testator's
expression of mere wish or desire as sufficient to impose
legal obligations on the trustee whenever the other ele-
ments of a trust were present, the modern weight of
authority allows precatory words to create a trust only
when all the surrounding circumstances show an intent
of the testator to impose legal obligations on the trustee
despite the use of the precatory language. 4 This rule of
construction has led to varied and irreconcilable decisions,
as courts are now dealing with discovering the actual in-
tent of the testator to impose binding obligations, which
8 Curnick v. Tucker, L.R. 17 Eq. 320 (1874) ; Gully v. Cregoe, 24 Bear.
185, 53 Eng. Rep. 327 (R.C. 1857) ; Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. 530, 30 Eng.
Rep. 760 (R.C. 1795); Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469, 26 Eng. Rep. 299
(R.C. 1739) ; for further cases see BOGERT, op. cit. supra, n. 7, pp. 342, 343;
SCOTT, op. cit. supra, n. 7, p. 191; also see 49 A.L.R. 14, n. 12 (1927).
9 Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. 268, 59 Am. Dec. 718 (1853) ; also see 54 Am.
Jur. 64, Trusts, § 55.
1054 Am. Jur. 64, Trusts, § 55.
' Stead v. Mellor, L.R. 5 Ch. Div. 225 (Eng. 1877).
Hood v. Oglander, 34 Beat. 513, 55 Eng. Rep. 733 (R.C. 1865).For further cases see SCOTT, Op. Cit. supra, n. 7, pp. 191, 192; RESTATE-
MrENT. TRUSTS (1935) Md. Anno. (1940) § 25.
11 For representative cases see In re Stuart's Estate, 274 Mich. 282, 264
N.W. 372 (1936); Brubaker v. Lauver, 322 Pa. 461, 185 A. 848 (1936);
McClure v. Carter, 202 Va. 191, 116 S.E. 2d 260 (1960) ; In re MacAdams
Estate. 45 Wash. 2d 527, 276 P. 2d 729 (1954) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS (2d ed.
1956) § 25; see also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) Md. Anno. (1940) § 25.
Contra: Tucker v. Myers' Estate, 151 Neb. 359, 37 N.W. 2d 585 (1949)
Hedrick v. Hedrick, 125 W.Va. 702, 25 S.E. 2d 872 (1943).
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under the earlier rule was presumed from precatory words
whenever the other elements of the trust were present.
No concrete rule can be formulated whereby the courts
can, in all cases, determine what terms or expressions will
impose a trust upon a bequest or devise. 5 The use of par-
ticular precatory expressions in the instrument provide
the courts with little assistance in ascertaining the actual
intent of the testator. 16 However, various guides to intent
have been formulated through a consideration of other
portions of the instrument and the position of the testator,
trustee and beneficiary of the alleged trust at the time of
the execution of the creating instrument.17 Where a testa-
tor has pointed out with certainty the objects of the trust
and the subject matter to which it is to attach, precatory
words will probably be sufficient to create a trust;"8 the
clarity and certainty of the subject matter and object are
construed by the court as evidence of the intention of the
testator. 9 A determining factor in some cases is the scope
of the alleged trustee's duties, i.e., whether the testator
gives the "trustee" very broad or merely ministerial dis-
cretionary powers.2 ° Finally, the relation between the vari-
ous parties may influence the court. Thus, when the sup-
posed beneficiary of the trust would ordinarily be a natural
object of the testator's bounty, the courts more readily
impose a trust upon property bequeathed by will notwith-
standing the use of precatory terms.2 In addition, where
'5Saylor v. Plaine. 31 Md. 158, 163, 1 Am. Rep. 34 (1869).
'5See 49 A.L.R. 42 et seq. (1927), which extensively reviews prior de-
cisions according to the precatory expressions employed; for supplemental
annotations see 70 A.L.R. 326 (1931) ; 107 A.L.R. 896 (1937).
"The text follows the factors as discussed in 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (1951) § 48, p. 344 et seq.; the following circumstances are listed
by RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 2d (1959) § 25 as worthy of consideration:
"(1) the imperative or precaitory character of the words used; (2)
the definiteness or indefiniteness of the property; (3) the definiteness
or indefiniteness of the beneficiaries or of the extent of their in-
terests; (4) the relations between the parties; (5) the financial situ-
ation of the parties; (6) the motives which may reasonably be sup-
posed to have influenced the settlor in making the disposition; (7)
whether the results reached by construing 'the transaction as a trust
or not a trust would be such as a person in the situation of the settlor
would naturally desire to produce."
Cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) Md. Ann. (1940) § 25.
11 Nunn v. O'Brien, 83 Md. 198, 200, 34 A. 244 (1896) ; Handley v. Wright-
son, 60 Md. 198, 203 (1883).
11Pratt v. Sheppard, etc. Hospital, 88 Md. 610, 627, 42 A. 51 (1898),
citing the leading authority Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. Jur. 522,
32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805).
0Cf. In re Fordrung's Will. 154 N.Y.S. 2d 552 (1956) ; Andrews v.
Hughes, 243 N.C. 616, 91 S.E. 2d 591 (1956) ; In re Pennock's Estate, 20
Pa. 268, 59 Am. Dec. 718 (1853).
-' Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300 (1888) ; Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 274
(1867).
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a testator employs words of request to his executor or
other person occuping a fiduciary position toward him, the
court will probably find the requisite trust intent.22 How-
ever, where property is bequeathed to the legatee abso-
lutely, the fact that the testator subsequently adds preca-
tory expressions is likely to have no legal effect and no trust
will be created.23 It should be emphasized that these factors
are merely guides to intent, that the presence or absence
of one or the other is usually not determinative in and of
itself, and that, as stated earlier, the result under the
modern rule should be governed by a consideration of all
the surrounding circumstances in each case.24
The first time the Maryland Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether words of recommendation created a trust
was in 1838 in Tolson v. Tolson.25 It was there held that
the testator in the devise to seven of his sons with a request
"to take care of their brother John Tolson and his family"
had imposed a trust upon that portion of the property
necessary for the proper support of John." The decision,
in that respect, seemed to follow the English rule; and,
forty-five years later, in Handley v. Wrightson" it was
stated that, although there have been decisions to the con-
trary, Maryland considers "the weight of authority to be
for upholding words of request, desire, expectation, and
the like, as creative of trusts, when the contrary does not
appear from the context or by necessary implication. ' '28
Fifteen years after this decision the leading Maryland
case of Pratt v. Sheppard, etc. Hospital29 was decided by
the Court of Appeals. In the midst of a lengthy opinion,
citing numerous authorities, the Court, through Chief Judge
McSherry stated:
"Whatever may have been the results reached in
the earlier cases . . there is a strong tendency nowa-
days to restrict the doctrine of precatory trusts. * * *
Whether or not a trust has been created in a given
2 In re Lawrence's Estate, 17 Cal. 2d 1, 108 P. 2d 893 (1941) ; In re
Mi1ody's Will, 155 Me. 325, 154 A. 2d 165, 73 A.L.R. 2d 1225 (1959).
'1Sands v. Church, etc., 181 Md. 536, 30 A. 2d 771 (1943); Nunn v.
O'Brien, 83 Md. 198, 34 A. 244 (1898); Williams v. Worthington, 49 Md.
572 (1878).
24 Supra, n. 14.
'5I0 G. & J. 159 (Md. 1838).
"However. the Court held that no trust was established with regard to
John Tolson's wife and children, the term "family" not designating any
individual persons with sufficient accuracy.
60 Md. 198 (1883).
Id., 201.
88 MAId. 610, 42 A. 51 (1898).
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case by the use of precatory words is, in the last
analysis, a question of construction and interpretation
to ascertain the intention."30
Subsequent Maryland decisions have tended to follow this
statement of the law.'
With regard to the decision of the Court in the prin-
cipal case impressing a trust on the insurance proceeds, it
should be noted that the Court apparently leaned toward
the Handley decision, 2 wherein it was declared that preca-
tory words presumptively create a trust. Although the
Court repeatedly referred to the ascertainment of the testa-
tor's intention and it is true that many of the factors
usually influencing the courts to find the necessary trust
intent were present (i.e., certainty in object of the trust
and subject matter;33 the fact that the appellee was a mem-
ber of the testator's household, and, therefore, a natural
object of his bounty;34 the fact that the legatees were, in
fact, designated by the testator as "trustees"35 ), the state-
ment by the testator in his will that he realized it was
beyond his power by that instrument to impress the trust
upon the insurance proceeds could be said to indicate that
the testator had no intent to impose legal obligations upon
the recipients of the same. Technically, it is difficult to
argue that the testator had the intent to impose legally
enforceable duties 6 upon the beneficiaries of the policy
when he had believed that it was beyond his power so to
do. However, the Court of Appeals apparently felt that
under all of the surrounding circumstances the testator's
precatory words should be sufficient to impose legal duties.
This may achieve an acceptable result on the facts of the
instant case, but it may give doctrinal purists some diffi-
culty in deciding whether the Court is following the older
or more modern approach to precatory expressions.
There is an additional problem in the instant case in
that even if the testator manifested the requisite intent to
impose a trust upon the insurance proceeds, as was found
Id., 623.
81 Sands v. Church, etc., 181 Md. 536, 30 A. 2d 771 (1943); Gerke v.
Colonial Trust Co., 114 Md. 289, 79 A. 587 (1911); Colburn v. Union
Infirmary, 114 Md. 94, 78 A. 817 (1910); Blackshere v. Samuel Ready
School, 94 Md. 773, 51 A. 1056 (1902) ; Williams v. The Oommittee, 92 Md.
497, 48 A. 930 (1901).
Handley v. Wrightson, 60 Md. 198 (1883).
8Supra, n. 18.
34 Supra, n. 21.
Supra, n. 22.
8 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 2d (1959) § 25, p. 69: "No trust is created unless
the settlor manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."
[VOL. XXII
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by the Court, it is arguable that the testator did not have
the power to impose such a trust. Immediately upon the
death of the insured, the insurance beneficiary's rights
under the insurance contract become completely fixed.37
Whether the insured can further affect the rights of the
beneficiary by his will depends upon the terms of the in-
surance contract. Where such a right is not reserved in
said agreement, a majority of jurisdictions hold that an
attempted modification by will is ineffective."8 However,
these courts will impose a trust upon the proceeds of in-
surance where, prior to the vesting of the named bene-
ficiary's interest, the insured has communicated to him an
intent that the beneficiary hold the proceeds for the benefit
of another. Where the named beneficiary of the policy
expressly promises or impliedly consents by silence to
effectuate the insured's intent, the courts will usually im-
pose a trust upon the proceeds in favor of the persons for
whom the testator intended the insurance proceeds to
benefit.8 9
The Court in the instant case cited three federal cases
apparently supporting its conclusion that the insured could
impress the insurance proceeds with the trust. The only
decision cited dealing with the trust problem was Burgess
v. Murray." In that case the beneficiary had been advised
by letter from the insured, prior to his demise, that the
said beneficiary was to apply the insurance proceeds in
favor of another. The court found a trust to have been
created. In the instant Waesche case 41 the trustees were
named as the beneficiaries of the insurance policy on the
same day that the testator executed his will. It would
appear, since it was not mentioned in the opinion, that
the beneficiaries had no knowledge until after the death
of the insured that he wished them to hold the proceeds
in trust.42 Assuming this is the correct interpretation of
87VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951) 680.
IsId., 686, n. 5.
89See Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of Promise by Beneficiary
of Life Insurance to Insured to Pay 'Proceeds, in Whole or Part, to Third
Persons, 102 A.L.R. 588 (1936) ; also see VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951)
§ 119.
to 194 F. 2d 131 (5th Cir. 1952) ; the other decisions cited, i.e., Batts v.
United States, 120 F. Supp. 26 (D. N.C. 1954) and Bradley v. United States,
143 F. 2d 573 (10th Cir. 1944) dealt with the problem of the validity of
an attempted change of a designated beneficiary by the insured.
& Waesche v. Rizzuto, 224 Md. 573, 168 A. 2d 871 (1961).
2When the money was received, each of the trustees deposited his
portion in a separate, individual bank account. One of the trustees later
Invested his $5,000 in stocks, registered in his and his wife's names jointly.
The trustee testified that his brother, the other trustee, had agreed to do
the same. He also testified that it had been determined that this money
19621
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the factual situation, there is, at least, an argument that a
trust could not have been impressed upon the insurance
proceeds. If the beneficiaries of the insurance policy have
no knowledge that they are to take the proceeds of said
policy in trust prior to the insured's death, there would
seem to be little ground upon which it could be argued
that they impliedly consented to hold the proceeds under
such condition before their right to the proceeds became
vested.
The Washington Supreme Court in an opinion arising
from facts closely analogous to those presented by the in-
stant case distinguished the Burgess decision 43 in a similar
manner.4 However, it was there decided that the Court
did not have to determine whether a positive direction in
the will of the insured to apply insurance proceeds in a
particular manner would be enforceable, when the bene-
ficiary had no knowledge of this direction prior to the in-
sured's death; there being no positive direction to the
beneficiary, only precatory words, which were not consid-
ered to have had mandatory force. The decision in the in-
stant case, therefore, apparently goes beyond the authori-
ties cited by the Court.
DANIEL F. THOMAS
Survival As An Implied Condition In A Contingent Gift
To A Class - The Demill Rule Revisited
Second Bank-State Street Trust Company v. Weston'
Testatrix, a domiciliary of Maryland, gave the residue
of her estate in trust to her three daughters for life, and
upon the death of the last of the three daughters to die,
the trust fund was to be distributed among the issue of
the testatrix's daughters per stirpes, but in the event of
the death of all three daughters "leaving no issue surviving
them," the trust fund was to go to the testatrix's "heirs at
law." Subsequent to testatrix's death in 1911 all three
daughters died without surviving issue. At the death in
1958 of the last surviving daughter a problem arose as
was not a part of the residue and remainder, but that it would be used
under the testaitor's wishes. Id., 580.
"Burgess v. Murray, 194 F. 2d 131 (5th Cir. 1952).
,In Re Milton's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 389, 294 P. 2d 412 (1956).
M... ass ... , 174 N.E. 2d 763 (1961).
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